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Abstract
In a recent paper, Suppes, de Barros, & Oas (2012) used neural oscillators to cre-
ate a model, based on reasonable neurophysiological assumptions, of the behavioral
stimulus-response (SR) theory. In this paper, we describe the main characteristics of
the model, emphasizing its physical and intuitive aspects.
1 Introduction
It is an honor for Acacio de Barros and Gary Oas to participate in a festschrift for
Pat Suppes. It is especially rewarding to do so with a paper where we discuss our
most recent work with Pat, a model of brain processes using neural oscillators.
We are, as Pat would say, “true blue physicists.” So, for us, collaborating with
Pat on this truly interdisciplinary paper is an example not only of his intellectual
influence, but also of his friendship and mentorship. We are happy to dedicate
this paper to Pat. Happy Birthday Pat!
The work we present here started more than ten years ago, when JAB and
Pat begun thinking about how to model in a physically plausible way collections
of neurons in terms of oscillators. In one of his known intuitions, Pat kept
insisting that the brain “gotta use oscillators.” Of course, as is often the case,
his “intuition” was based on hard work and detailed empirical data that he
collected working on the EEG of words and sentences. Nevertheless, as we
kept trying to make our model work (and we had many failures, and some
successes; see Vassilieva et al. (2011) for an example), Pat kept insisting: we
should understand the brain computations with oscillators. I am pleased to
say that, despite my initial skepticism, we now have a model that we feel is not
only grounded on neurophysiologically sound evidence, but that also reproduces
quite well some empirical behavioral data (Suppes, de Barros, & Oas, 2012).
In this paper we attempt to describe the main features this model by fo-
cusing on the physical processes underlying the neural computations. We chose
to do so for the following reasons. First, because of its interdisciplinarity, our
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model requires concepts from many different areas (neurophysiology, physics,
psychology, etc). Such concepts are not complex, but are often unfamiliar to
most researchers. Second, we are confident that our model is relevant to cogni-
tive psychologists, as it may explain some mathematical models showing good
empirical fit (de Barros, 2012a,b). So, we believe that this paper can provide a
clearer and intuitive view of the main physical features of our model for those
thinking about applying it, supplementing the discussions found in Suppes, de
Barros, & Oas (2012).
Let us start our discussion with the broad problem of understanding how
the brain processes information. This is perhaps the most challenging cur-
rent scientific endeavors, mainly due to the fact that our brain is tremendously
complicated, as it is constituted of many different components that are, by
themselves, complex, but that also seem to sometimes interact holistically with
each other. Among the approaches to try and understand the brain, the most
prominent ones are the top-down and bottom-up. In the top-down approach,
we start with the higher-level functions and go to their underlying mechanisms.
An example of such approach would be the field of cognitive neuroscience, where
often one starts with experiments in cognitive psychology and tries to under-
stand them from principles in neuroscience (Adolphs, 2003). In the bottom-up
approach, one tries to start with neurophysiology, and by studying how each
elementary component works, one tries to see how higher functions arise from
such components or their interaction (Kandel et al., 2000).
Each of those approaches have their shortcomings. For example, one of the
main issues is what we may call a problem of scale. When trying to understand
a complex system, the first question that arises is how detailed we need to be.
In the case of the brain, some researchers say that we need to go all the way
down to the chemical reactions in the synapses. Others argue that individual
neurons hold the key to understanding brain computation. Yet another view is
that collections of neurons are important. So, when trying to understand how
the brain works, our first problem is where to begin. Regardless of what scale is
chosen and where we start, ultimately we would need to understand the whole
process if we were to claim to have understood the brain.
The main problem with connecting a higher scale with a lower one is due
to its complexity. For example, evidence exists that higher cognitive processes
involve tens to hundreds of thousands of neurons, interacting with each other in
very complex ways. Modeling such processes require the use of powerful com-
puters. But, even when a model is shown to work from the underlying neuronal
dynamics, the use of massive computer simulations helps little in understanding,
in an intuitive or conceptual way, what is actually happening. The system is
simply too complex.
To deal with the issue of complexity, different approaches can be taken. One
possible route is to find physically plausible arguments that impose constraints
on the system’s dynamics, therefore reducing it to fewer degrees of freedom. This
is the approach taken by Suppes, de Barros, & Oas (2012). In their paper, a large
number of independent neurons was modeled by a single dynamical parameter
determined by the phase of a neural oscillator. They then showed that under
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certain reasonable assumptions, the main characteristics of behavioral stimulus-
response (SR) theory could be described by neural oscillators. The use of neural
oscillators thus provided a significant reduction on the number of degrees of
freedom, allowing for the physical interpretation of many different parameters
in the model.
In this paper we present the work of Suppes, de Barros, & Oas (2012),
with emphasis on the physics and intuition behind the model. Our goal is to
make this model more understandable, as many of the concepts used in our
previous paper are not well-known to certain audiences. For example, while all
physicists have an excellent knowledge of oscillations and interference and could
easily follow the arguments leading from neurons to oscillators, only a few would
feel comfortable with the mathematical learning theories used. Neuroscientists,
on the other hand, would probably feel at home with neurons and learning
theories, but not so much with oscillators and interference. Neither would most
psychologists. Here we focus on the intuitions behind the physics, with the hopes
that, in conjunction with the oscillator model, psychologists and neuroscientists
could benefit more from the insights gained.
2 A Brief Review of SR theory
Stimulus-response theory (or SR theory; see Suppes and Atkinson (1960)) is one
of the most successful behavioral learning theories in psychology. Though it has
decreased in importance in current psychology, we chose to model SR theory for
the following reasons. First, it is based on a rigid trial structure, which permits
its concepts to be formally axiomatized, resulting in many important non-trivial
but illuminating representation theorems (Suppes, 2002). In fact, the theory is
rich enough to represent language in it. Second, despite its few parameters (the
learning probability c and the number of stimuli), it has been shown to fit well
to empirical data in a variety of experiments. Finally, as we showed in Suppes,
de Barros, & Oas (2012), SR theory seems to have natural counterparts at a
neuronal level, and is, in some sense still used by neuroscientists (though, sadly,
not in its mathematical form).
Here we present the mathematical version of SR theory for a continuum of
responses, formalized in terms of a stochastic process (we follow Suppes, de
Barros, & Oas, 2012). Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let Z, S, R,
and E be random variables, with Z : Ω → E|S| S : Ω → S, R : Ω → R, and
E : Ω→ E, where S is the set of stimuli, R the set of responses, and E the set
of reinforcements. Then a trial in SR theory has the following structure:
Zn → Sn → Rn → En → Zn+1. (1)
The trial structure works the following way. Trial n starts with a certain state
of conditioning and a sampled stimulus. Once a stimulus is sampled, a response
is computed according to the state of conditioning. Then, reinforcement fol-
lows, which can lead (with probability c) to a new state of conditioning for
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trial n + 1 . In more detail, at the beginning of a trial, the state of condition-
ing is represented by the random variable Zn =
(
z
(n)
1 , . . . , z
(n)
m
)
. The vector(
z
(n)
1 , . . . , z
(n)
m
)
associates to each stimuli si ∈ S, i = 1, . . . ,m, where m = |S|
is the cardinality of S, a value z
(n)
i on trial n. Once a stimulus Sn = si is sam-
pled with probability P (Sn = si|siǫS) = 1
m
, its corresponding z
(n)
i determines
the probability of responses in R by the probability distribution K
(
r|z(n)i
)
, i.e.
P
(
a1 ≤ Rn ≤ a2|Sn = si,Zn,i = z(n)i
)
=
∫ a2
a1
k
(
x|z(n)i
)
dx, where k
(
x|z(n)i
)
is the probability density associated to the distribution, and where Zn,i is
the i-th component of the vector
(
z
(n)
1 , . . . , z
(n)
m
)
. The probability distribu-
tion K
(
r|z(n)i
)
is the smearing distribution, and it is determined by its vari-
ance and mode z
(n)
i . The next step is the reinforcement En, which is effective
with probability c, i.e. P
(
Zn+1,i = y|Sn = si,En = y,Zn,i = z(n)i
)
= c and
P
(
Zn+1,i = z
(n)
i |Sn = si,En = y,Zn,i = z(n)i
)
= 1 − c. The trial ends with a
new (with probability c) state of conditioning Zn+1.
3 Oscillator model
In this section we will describe intuitively the oscillator model. We start by
arguing for the use of neural oscillators as a way to model the brain at a system
level. We then discuss how we can represent in a mathematically sensible way
these oscillators. Finally, we show how response computations and learning can
be modeled using this theoretical apparatus. Readers interested in more detail
are referred to Suppes, de Barros, & Oas (2012).
There are many different ways in which researchers try to figure out how the
brain works. For example, in cognitive neuroscience, among the most popular
research techniques are fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), MEG
(magnetoencephalogram), and EEG (electroencephalogram). MEG and EEG
measure the electrical activities in the brain, whereas fMRI measures changes
in blood flow associated with higher metabolic rates. While fMRI’s popularity is
due to its better spatial resolution, MEG and EEG present significantly better
time resolution. However, what these techniques have in common is that, in
order to measure a signal from the brain, they require a large numbers of neurons
to fire synchronously. To make our point, let us focus on EEG (though MEG
would be adequate too). There are many experiments (see Carvalhaes et al.
(2012) and references) showing that the EEG data allow a good representation
of language or visual imagery. Thus, neurophysiological evidence points toward
language being an activity involving large collections of synchronizing neurons,
and we will center our model exactly on this.
Before we show how to describe such collections of synchronizing neurons
mathematically, it is useful to think about the physical mechanisms of synchro-
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TA
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t (a.u.)
t0 t0+TA t0+2TA
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V (a.u.)
t (a.u.)
t0 t0+TB t0+2TAB
Fig. 1: Approximate shape of the action potentials VA and VB as a function of
time t for two uncoupled neurons nA and nB firing periodically, with
periods TA and TB. For simplicity, we chose a t0 when both neurons fire
simultaneously.
nization. Let us look first at individual neurons, and then think about ensembles
of neurons. Figure 1 shows the qualitative behavior of two neurons nA and nB
firing periodically, with TB < TA. What happens if we now couple nA to an
excitatory synapse coming from neuron nB? Because t0 + TB < t0 + TA, the
excitatory coupling will increase the membrane potential of neuron nA before
t0+TA, causing nA to fire a little earlier than it would if it were not connected to
nB. So, excitatory synaptic couplings between neurons can change the timing
of coupling, and this timing is changed such that the firings of both neurons
approach (in this case, the firing of nA approaches that of nB). In other words,
excitatory couplings push nA and nB toward synchronization. In fact, it is pos-
sible to prove mathematically that if the number of neurons is large enough, the
sum of the many weak synaptic interactions can cause a strong effect, making all
neurons fire closer together (Izhikevich, 2007); even when weakly coupled, en-
sembles of periodically firing neurons synchronize. It is interesting to note that
the argument shown above can be scaled up to distinct collections of neurons.
Imagine we have two ensembles of neurons, NA and NB, such that neurons in
them synchronize. If neurons in NA and NB become coupled, then the same
mechanism as discussed above will be at play, and the ensembles will synchro-
nize among themselves. We will come back to this point later, when we talk
about response mechanisms.
We are now in good shape to introduce the intuition behind the mathemati-
cal description for the dynamics of synchronization. One of the main simplifying
3 Oscillator model 6
assumptions we make is that the relevant information coded in the brain is rep-
resented by the synchronization of an ensemble of neurons. This ensemble may
include tens of thousands of neurons, but because they are synchronized, we can
represent them, at least in first approximation, by a single dynamical variable.
To understand this, let us think about the simplest case, where an oscillator
O (t) can be represented by a sine function1:
O (t) = A sinωt, (2)
where ω = ω (t) is its time-dependent frequency. Since ω may be a function of
time, the value of O (t) is completely determined by the argument of the sine, i.e.
by ϕ = ωt. The quantity ϕ is the phase of the oscillatorO (t) = A sinϕ (t). Since
collections of firing neurons have very little variability in its intensity (except,
as we see below, when they interfere), we can describe a neural oscillator by its
phase. The interaction of a neural oscillator with other neural oscillators may
change the evolution of its phase.
We emphasize that there is a certain invariance of scale in the above argu-
ment: it somehow does not matter how many neurons we have; all that matters
is that their amplitude does not vary, that their couplings are strong enough
to produce synchronization, and that their dynamics is encoded in the phase.
Furthermore, in the same way that individual oscillating neurons synchronize to
each other, a collection of coherent neurons can also synchronize to another col-
lection of coherent neurons. Since neurons firing coherently may be described
approximately by their phase, we can focus on the phase dynamics, instead
of being concerned about the full description of the very complex dynamical
system.
Now, let us look a little more into the details of the mathematics of two
synchronizing oscillators. Let us start with two oscillators, O1 (t) and O2 (t),
described by their phases ϕ1 and ϕ2. If the two oscillators are uncoupled and
their frequency ω is constant, then it is clear from equation (2) that they should
satisfy the following set of differential equations,
dϕ1
dt
= ω1, (3)
dϕ2
dt
= ω2, (4)
where ωi, i = 1, 2, are their natural frequencies. However, if they are weakly
coupled, such that their interaction does not affect the overall form of the os-
cillations given by O1 (t) and O2 (t) but affects their phase, then equations (3)
and (4) need to be modified to include changes to the phase. Furthermore, if
the underlying interaction is such that it will make the phases approach each
other, such as in the case of synaptically coupled neurons, then it is possible to
1 We use a sine function for simplicity, but the following argument is valid for periodic
functions.
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show that, in first approximation, the modified dynamical equations become
dϕ1
dt
= ω1 − k12 sin (ϕ1 − ϕ2) , (5)
dϕ2
dt
= ω2 − k21 sin (ϕ2 − ϕ1) , (6)
where kij are the phase coupling strengths. If we extend this to allow for N
oscillators, equations (5) and (6) then become
dϕi
dt
= ωi −
∑
j 6=i
kij sin (ϕi − ϕj) . (7)
Equation (7) is known as Kuramoto equation (Kuramoto, 1984), and it is widely
used to describe complex systems with emergent synchronization. The strength
and usefulness of Kuramoto’s equation comes from two main points. First, it
can be solved under certain symmetric conditions and in the limit of large N ,
yielding significant insight into the nature of emerging synchronization. Second,
a set of weakly-coupled oscillating dynamical systems close to a Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation can be described, in first approximation, by Kuramoto-like equations
(see Izhikevich (2007)). For our purpose, Kuramoto’s equations are a good
approximation for the dynamics of coupled neural oscillators.
So, we now turn into the discussion of how we can think of stimulus and
response as modeled by oscillators, and in particular by Kuramoto’s equations.
The basic idea is simple. Once a distal stimulus is presented, the perceptual
system activates an ensemble of brain neurons, Ns, associated with it. This
system itself is described by Kuramoto’s equations, and, because it synchronizes,
we use its average phase to describe its mean dynamics. If this stimulus elicits a
response, the activation of the response neurons via synaptic couplings follows.
Responses, as stimuli, are also represented by synchronously firing ensemble
of neurons. The selection of a particular response happens when the stimulus
oscillator synchronizes in phase with it, and such phase is determined by the
relative couplings between stimulus and response oscillators. Let us now look
more into its detail.
The simplest stimulus-response neural oscillator model requires three os-
cillators, Os, Or1 , and Or2 . Os is the oscillator representing firing neurons
corresponding to the sampling of a stimulus, and Or1 and Or2 are the response
oscillators. Their phases are ϕs, ϕr1 , and ϕr2 . Before we describe their dy-
namics, let us go through the process of a response computation. Whenever Os
is activated, and subsequently Or1 and Or2 , then the intensity of firings (i.e.,
the rate of firing, as the individual neuron amplitudes are reasonably stable) in
each response oscillator is not only due to its firing, but also to the firings of
Os. As we mentioned earlier, a collection of firing neurons may interfere, and
in this case, interference means stronger firing rates when in phase, and weaker
firing rates when off of phase. Let us analyze this with a mathematically simple
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example of equal intensity harmonic oscillators, given by
Os(t) = A cos (ω0t) = A cos (ϕs(t)) , (8)
Or1(t) = A cos (ω0t+ δφ1) = A cos (ϕr1(t)) , (9)
Or2(t) = A cos (ω0t+ δφ2) = A cos (ϕr2(t)) . (10)
Equations (8)–(10) represent the case where the oscillators are already syn-
chronized with the same frequency ω0 but with relative but constant phase
differences δφ1 and δφ2. The mean intensity give us a measure of the excitation
carried by the oscillations, and for the superposition of Os(t) and Or1(t) it is
given by
I1 =
〈
(Os(t) +Or1(t))
2
〉
t
=
〈
Os(t)
2
〉
t
+
〈
Or1(t)
2
〉
t
+ 〈2Os(t)Or1(t)〉t ,
where 〈f (t)〉t0 = 1∆T
∫ t0+∆T
t0
f (t) dt (∆T ≫ 1/ω0) is the time average . A quick
computation yields
I1 = A
2 (1 + cos (δφ1)) ,
and, similarly for I2,
I2 = A
2 (1 + cos (δφ2)) .
Therefore, the intensity depends on the phase difference between the response-
computation oscillators and the stimulus oscillator.
Now, the maximum intensity of I1 and I2 is 2A
2, whereas their minimum
intensity is zero. If we think of I1 and I2 as competing possible responses, the
maximum difference between them happens when one of their relative phases
(with respect to the stimulus oscillator) is zero while the other is π. It is standard
to use the contrast, defined by
b =
I1 − I2
I1 + I2
, (11)
as a measure of how different the intensities are. From its definition, b takes
values between −1 and 1. When I1 and I2 are as different as possible, |b| = 1;
if, on the other hand, I1 and I2 are the same, b = 0.
The contrast provides us with a useful way to think about responses that
are between r1 and r2. To see this, let us impose
δφ1 = δφ2 + π ≡ δφ, (12)
which results in
I1 = A
2 (1 + cos (δφ)) , (13)
and
I2 = A
2 (1− cos (δφ)) . (14)
In this case, the single parameter δφ is sufficient to determine the contrast, as
b = cos (δφ) , (15)
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0 ≤ δϕ ≤ π. So, the phase difference δφ between stimulus and response oscilla-
tors codes a continuum of responses between −1 and 1 (more precisely, because
δϕ is a phase, the interval is in the unit circle T, and not in a compact interval
in R). For arbitrary intervals (ζ1, ζ2), all that is required is a re-scaling of b.
To summarize the above arguments. When a stimulus and response os-
cillators activate, they fire periodically,leading to their synchronization with
constant phase relation. This phase relation causes interference, which in turn
determines the relative strength of the intensities for each response. Thus, re-
sponses are determined by the interference of oscillators, which is itself affected
by the neural oscillators’ couplings.
We now examine in more detail the mathematics of the stimulus and response
model. Let us look at each step of (1).
Sampling
When a stimulus sn is sampled, a collection of neurons start firing synchronously,
corresponding to the activation of a neural oscillator, Osn . Such activation leads
to a spreading of activation to oscillators coupled to the stimulus oscillator, in-
cluding the response Or1 and Or2 . Since the selection and activation of Osn
involves the perceptual system, we do not attempt to model with neural oscil-
lators this step, but simply assume their activation in a way that is consistent
with the stochastic process represented in SR theory by the random variable
Sn. Furthermore, though it would be important to develop a detailed theory of
spreading activation, we do not, as for our current purposes it suffices to simply
assume the activation of Or1 and Or2 .
Response
After the stimulus sn is sampled, the active oscillators evolve for the time in-
terval ∆tr, the time it takes to compute a response, according to the following
set of Kuramoto differential equations.
dϕi
dt
= ωi −
∑
i6=j
kij sin (ϕi − ϕj + δij) , (16)
where kij is the coupling constant between oscillators i and j, and δij is an
anti-symmetric matrix representing phase differences, and i and j can be either
Osn , Or1 , or Or2 . Here we use the notation where Oi corresponds to a neural
oscillator and ϕi to its phase. Equation (16) can be rewritten as
dϕi
dt
= ωi −
∑
j
[
kEij sin (ϕi − ϕj) + kIij cos (ϕi − ϕj)
]
, (17)
where kEij = kij cos (δij) and k
I
ij = kij sin (δij), which has an immediate phys-
ical interpretation: kEij corresponds to excitatory couplings, whereas k
I
ij corre-
sponds to inhibitory ones. These are the 4N
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strengths between oscillators.
dϕi
dt
= ω0 −
∑
i6=j
[
kEi,j sin (ϕi − ϕj)− kIi,j cos (ϕi − ϕj)
]
, (18)
where ω0 is their natural frequency. The solutions to (18) and the initial con-
ditions randomly distributed at activation give us the phases at time tr,n =
ts,n +∆tr. The coupling strengths between oscillators determine their relative
phase locking, which in turn corresponds to the computation of a given response,
according to equation (11).
Reinforcement and Conditioning
As we saw above, the computation of a response depends on the inhibitory and
excitatory couplings between neural oscillators. Therefore, when an effective
reinforcement Yn corresponding to changes in the conditioning Zn+1 occurs,
the coupling strengths change. As with stimulus and responses, we represent
a reinforcement by a neural oscillator. Such oscillator, with frequency ωe, is
activated during reinforcement, and we assume that it forces the reinforced
response-computation and stimulus oscillators to synchronize with the same
phase difference of δϕ, while the two response-computation oscillators are kept
synchronized with a phase difference of π. Let the reinforcement oscillator be
activated on trial n at time te,n, tr,n+1 > te,n > tr,n, for an interval of time
∆te. Let K0 be the coupling strength between the reinforcement oscillator
and the stimulus and response-computation oscillators. In order to match the
probabilistic SR axiom governing the effectiveness of reinforcement, we also
assume that there is a normal probability distribution governing the coupling
strength K0 between the reinforcement and the other active oscillators with
probability density
f (K0) =
1
σK0
√
2π
exp
{
− 1
2σ2K0
(
K0 −K0
)2}
. (19)
When a reinforcement is effective, all active oscillators phase-reset at te,n, and
during reinforcement the phases of the active oscillators evolve according to the
following set of differential equations.
dϕi
dt
= ω0 −
∑
i6=j
[
kEi,j sin (ϕi − ϕj)− kIi,j cos (ϕi − ϕj)
]
−K0 sin (ϕi − ωet+Φi) , (20)
where Φsn − Φr1 = δϕ and Φr1 − Φr2 = π. The excitatory couplings are rein-
forced if the oscillators are in phase with each other, according to the following
equations.
dkEi,j
dt
= ǫ (K0)
[
α cos (ϕi − ϕj)− kEi,j
]
. (21)
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Similarly, for inhibitory connections, if two oscillators are perfectly off sync,
then we have a reinforcement of the inhibitory connections.
dkIi,j
dt
= ǫ (K0)
[
α sin (ϕi − ϕj)− kIi,j
]
, (22)
In the above equations,
ǫ (K0) =
{
0 if K0 < K
′
ǫ0 otherwise,
(23)
where ǫ0 ≪ ω0, α and K0 are constant during ∆te, and K ′ is a threshold
constant throughout all trials. We can think of K ′ as a threshold below which
the reinforcement oscillator has no (or very little) effect on the stimulus and
response-computation oscillators. For large enough values of∆te, the behavioral
probability parameter c of effective reinforcement mentioned above is, from (19)
and (23), reflected in the equation:
c =
∫ ∞
K′
f (K0) dK0. (24)
This relationship comes from the fact that, if K0 < K
′, there is no effective
learning from reinforcement, since there are no changes to the couplings due to
(21)–(22), and (18) describing the oscillators’ behavior. Intuitively K ′ is the
effectiveness parameter: the larger it is, the smaller the probability of effective
reinforcement.
4 Final remarks
In this paper we described the neural oscillator model presented in Suppes, de
Barros, & Oas (2012), with particular emphasis to the physics and intuition
behind many of the processes represented by equations (18). To summarize
it, the coded phase differences were used to model a continuum of responses
within SR theory in the following way. At the beginning of a trial a stimulus
oscillator is activated, and with it the response oscillators. Then, the coupled
oscillator system evolves according to (18) if no reinforcement is present, and
according to (20)–(22) if reinforcement is present. The coupling constants and
the conditioning of stimuli are not reset at the beginning of each trial, and
changes to couplings correspond to effective reinforcement. Because of the finite
amount of time for a response, the probabilistic characteristics of the initial
conditions lead to the smearing of the phase differences after a certain time,
with an effect similar to that of the smearing distribution in the SR model for
a continuum of responses (Suppes, 1959).
We emphasize that in this paper we focused mainly on the physical basis
of our model, and did not go much into mathematical detail. Furthermore, in
Suppes, de Barros, & Oas (2012) we applied the neural oscillator model to many
different experimental situations illustrated in the literature, whereas here we
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did not address in detail any empirical data. Interested readers are referred to
our original paper.
SR theory has enjoyed tremendous success in the past, and, in a certain
sense, its main features are still present in modern day neuroscience. We be-
lieve that by showing how neurons may result in theoretical structures that are
somewhat similar to SR ones, as done in Suppes, de Barros, & Oas (2012), we
can provide the basis for an extension of SR theory that could be considered
more realistic. For example, in our model, many parameters, such as time of
response, frequency of oscillations, coupling strengths, etc., were fixed based on
reasonable assumptions. However, a more detailed and systematic study should
be able to relate such parameters to either underlying physiological constraints
or to behavioral variations, thus opening up the possibilities for new empiri-
cal studies that go beyond SR theory. Also, in our model we postulated many
features without showing or proving their dynamics from underlying neuronal
dynamics. This was the case for the activation of a stimulus and the spreading of
activation of a stimulus and responses. A more detailed theory based on neural
oscillators of such dynamics would certainly provide interesting empirical tests.
Finally, the use of neural oscillators and interference may also help explain
certain aspects of cognition that are considered “non-classical.” The distinction
between classical and quantum behavior is a subtle one, and still not yet un-
derstood. For example, a well studied quantum-like decision making process is
the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle, shown in a series of experiments
by Tversky and Shaffir (Shafir and Tversky, 1992; Tversky and Shafir, 1992).
Similar violations do not need any quantum-like representation in the form of
a Hilbert space, as proposed in the literature, but instead can be obtained by
interference of neural oscillators (de Barros, 2012b). Furthermore, the use of
neural oscillator interference even leads to predictions that are not compatible
with a Hilbert space structure (de Barros, 2012a), suggesting that the use of
quantum-like processes is not as quantum as many would wish.
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